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I. WHAT IS FREE FLIGHT?
Imagine a better way.
One that frees you to go your own way.
Choosing your own optimum routes, speeds and
flight levels. IFR-direct to any
destination. Saving billions of dollars in
airline operating costs each year.
T HIS DESCRIPTION OF free flight is from a recent maga-
zine advertisement by a leading maker of aircraft electron-
ics.' The ad conveys the elegantly simplistic fundamental
concepts of free flight. The ad's offer to "imagine" a system ac-
curately describes the current state of free flight as a concept
that is merely in the planning stages. The ad also portrays the
tantalizing promises of savings that proponents argue will result
from the free flight system.
While there does not appear to be a rigorous definition of the
term free flight in the United States, it is generally used to refer
to a system where control by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) sys-
tem is eliminated or greatly reduced.2 As used in this Article,
I AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 24, 1996, at 4th cover (Rockwell Collins
Avionics ad).
2 The RTCA (Radio Technology Commission of America) defines free flight as
[A] safe and efficient flight operating capability under instrument
flight rules (IFR) in which the operators have the freedom to select
their path and speed in real time. Air traffic restrictions are only
imposed to ensure separation, to preclude exceeding airport capac-
ity, to prevent unauthorized flight through Special Use Airspace
(SUA), and to ensure safety of flight. Restrictions are limited in
extent and duration to correct the identified problem. Any activity
which removes restrictions represents a move toward free flight.
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free flight refers to the generic idea of a system where aircraft
are under their own control with regard to route selection and
flight planning, and the Air Traffic Management system (ATM)
is a passive observer of the aircraft and airspace, interacting only
to resolve conflicts that present a danger to the aircraft.' Free
flight is "free" when compared with the conventional ATC sys-
tem where aircraft are assigned discrete routes and continually
interact with ATC via radio communications.4 There are still el-
ements of control in such a system (that is, at a minimum letting
the system know where the aircraft is), control by the ATM sys-
tem is passive unless there is a need to intervene for safety. Eu-
ropean and Asian ATM systems have analogous concepts, as will
be discussed further below, but they are known by different
names.
5
This Article will not attempt to comment on the viability of
the various free flight proposals. But, the Article will point out
the various free flight implementation options as they relate to
potential technologies. The purpose of the introductory sec-
tions is to set forth some of the various concepts of free flight
and the technologies to be used in order to provide a back-
ground for a discussion of the liability issues that will face the
free flight equipment manufacturers. In the conclusion, the au-
thors suggest that proactive measures may be taken to deal with
the potential liability problems that face manufacturers.
II. THE BASIC ISSUES ARISING IN FREE FLIGHT
All forms of free flight need to address the same set of issues.
The Air Traffic Management system (ATM) must provide a sys-
tem of avoiding conflicts (that is, avoiding collisions and situa-
tions that can have adverse safety consequences). If a magic box
could be put in each aircraft to allow the aircraft to electroni-
RADIO TECHNICAL COMMISSION FOR AERONAUTICS, FINAL REPORT OF RTCA TASK
FORCE 3: FREE FLIGHT IMPLEMENTATION 23 (1995) [hereinafter TASK FORCE 3
REPORT].
S Some proponents extend the concept to cover the entire flight from push
back at departure to parking at the destination. See David R. Hinson, The Future
of Air Traffic Control: Bringing Free Flight to Global Aviation, Remarks at the
Financial Times World Aerospace Conference (Aug. 29, 1996).
4 See 14 CFR pt. 91 (1996).
5 The concepts of the European and Asian systems are similar enough that the
discussions of technology of free flight apply to these systems. In Europe, the
analogous concept is referred to as Program for Harmonized Air Traffic Manage-
ment Research (PHARE). Kieran Daly, Flying Into the Future, FLIGHT INT'L, July
17, 1996.
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cally see and avoid all other aircraft, this would be the ideal tech-
nology for a true free flight system. Unfortunately, magic boxes
do not exist. As currently conceptualized, each of the free flight
ATM proposals involve a combination of ground-based monitor-
ing by the ATM agencies of the various nations (the Federal Avi-
ation Administration (FAA) in the United States) and aircraft
equipment to communicate with the ATM system and/or issue
control instructions the aircraft in a highly automated manner.6
The ground-based ATM agency must, at a minimum, know what
aircraft are in the system, their location, and their route inten-
tions. The ATM system must have the capability either to inter-
vene and issue instructions to avoid the development of a
hazardous situation, or, if onboard systems are used to avoid
conflicts, the ATM system must be able to monitor the aircraft's
compliance with avoidance maneuvers generated by the air-
craft's systems.
If rational economic considerations control the decision to se-
lect a free flight system, the chosen system must not only resolve
all of these problems, but must do so in a manner that will offer
economical advantages to significant elements of the aviation
community. Absent political considerations, the savings result-
ing from a free flight system should be at least enough to offset
the cost of establishing and maintaining such a system.
If history provides a guide, it would indicate that any free
flight system that will be implemented must also be downward
compatible. In other words, it must be either capable of dealing
with all the aircraft that currently operate in the airspace con-
trolled by the ATM system, or it must control aircraft only in
some subset of the airspace in which flight by some aircraft may
be prohibited. The system's airborne components must either
be cheap enough to be incorporated in all aircraft, or the free
flight must control some subset of existing aircraft (such as air-
line and sophisticated general aviation aircraft) that can afford
the necessary equipment. The ground-based components must
also exist as either an addition to, or overlay to, a system provid-
ing control services to all aircraft. In any event, the free flight
system, or the incorporation of free flight as a subcomponent of
the ATM system, must provide safe separation for all aircraft us-
ing the system in all phases of flight. Unfortunately, the burden
of a requirement to include all current types of aircraft in a fu-
6 RADIO TECHNICAL COMMISSION FOR AERONAUTICS, FREE FLIGHT ACTION PLAN 3
(1996).
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ture free flight system is analogous to the implementation of a
telephone system based on new technology that must still pro-
vide services for rotary dial telephones using copper pair wiring.
The aviation community has witnessed the incorporation of a
number of changes to the ATM system in the United States over
the years that may serve as examples (both good and bad) as to
how free flight technology implementation and downward com-
patibility might be addressed. Since World War II, the domestic
ATM system has absorbed changes to the frequency utilization
of the VHF spectrum requiring more complex radios, the devel-
opment of the current navigational aids system incorporating
VOR, DME, ILS, and ADF procedures, and the development of
civil airspace restrictions such as Class B and Class C airspace
(formerly Terminal Control and Radar Advisory Areas respec-
tively) that brought with them the requirement to use the alti-
tude encoding Mode C transponder.7 We have recently
witnessed the development, and predicted demise, of the LO-
RAN C system for use in aircraft navigation." As most readers
are aware, the demise of the LORAN C system is coming about
not because the system does not work and does not offer signifi-
cant advantages over previously used navigational systems, but
because the advent of the newer Global Positioning System
(GPS) navigation systems in aircraft have made LORAN C a re-
dundant system whose operating expense can no longer be justi-
fied.9 As discussed below, it has been the development of the
GPS system that now allows serious consideration of the imple-
mentation of free flight systems.
Each of these changes to the ATM system has involved, in one
manner or another, the providing of a new service based on new
technologies, while retaining provisions to deal with the existing
fleet of aircraft, many of which are not, and will never be,
equipped with the technology required to implement the newer
systems. The current ATM system provides for control over
everything from the Space Shuttle to non-radio equipped air-
craft.10 Airspace restrictions provide the first level of control.
Unless an aircraft is properly equipped, it must stay out of cer-
tain airspace, and those aircraft operating within the airspace
are assumed to meet the minimum equipment requirements for
7 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.130-.131, 91.215 (1996).
8 BILL CLARKE, AVIATION GUIDE TO GPS 76-79 (1994).
9 Id.
10 AJRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL ch. 5 (1996).
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operation.11 The use of primary radar in addition to transpon-
der returns provides the ATM system with the ability to provide
services in areas where aircraft with varying technologies coexist.
Even if a non-transponder equipped aircraft allows the FAA to
detect and resolve conflicts that may exist between aircraft that
are in communication with the control facility, and other air-
craft that may or may not be in communication with the control
facility.' 2
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE FLIGHT
METHODOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES
The aviation industry and the FAA have jointly conducted the
current planning of free flight in the United States. The Radio
Technology Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), an independ-
ent advisory organization that advises the FAA on technology is-
sues, 3 has provided input to the FAA. A subcommittee of the
RTCA has been selected to deal with free flight implementation
and planning. Its report to the FAA administrator in 1995 pro-
vides the current status of free flight thinking in the United
States. 14
TV. THE TECHNOLOGIES ASSOCIATED WITH FREE
FLIGHT PROPOSALS
The key development that has led to the serious consideration
of free flight is the Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation
system. GPS, described in more detail below, offers a method of
knowing with great accuracy where all GPS equipped aircraft are
located at any time, without the use of radar."
An aircraft's GPS receiver can determine the aircraft's loca-
tion in space including its altitude, latitude, and longitude. 6
That information can then be automatically transmitted to
ground-based computers that track the aircraft's movement, de-
termine whether or not there are projected conflicts with other
aircraft, and transmit orders to the aircraft for conflict avoid-
ance. 1 7 With the increasing power of microcomputers, aircraft
11 Id. ch. 3.
12 Id.
13 See TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 2.
14 Id.
15 CLARKE, supra note 8, at 13.
16 Id.
17 The free flight system envisions two "bubbles" surrounding each aircraft.
These bubbles are called the protected zone and the conflict zone. As the air-
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using free flight may perform many of the same calculations as
the ground-based computer, and may assume some of the con-
flict management functions. The ultimate implementation of
free flight may use a combination of ground- and aircraft-based
computer monitoring/tracking.
One of the key debates that will occur as free flight comes
closer to realization is what elements of the current ATM system
will need to be retained."' One can speculate that a driving
function of the free flight proposals is the FAA's desire to elimi-
nate the costly operation of the primary radar systems in the
United States as well as the costly manual handling of each air-
craft. But, can the current system be completely eliminated? If
not, then many of the anticipated cost savings of free flight may
prove to be illusory.
In the following sections, the technologies needed to imple-
ment the free flight system are discussed. Heavy emphasis is
placed on the GPS system because GPS is the key to free flight
proposal and is now being rapidly incorporated into the current
ATM system.
A. UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM AND
ITS CAPABILITIES
The development of the Global Positioning System (GPS)
navigation system makes it possible to consider the implementa-
tion of free flight. Therefore, an understanding of the basics of
GPS is essential to understanding the technology of free flight.
1. General Description and History
The Global Positioning System (GPS) system is a space-based
navigational system that uses mid-altitude orbiting satellites as
celestial radio beacons, or, as some people prefer, artificial con-
stellations.' 9 The transmissions from the satellites allow ground
craft moves through the system, any intrusion into the bubbles causes the system
to react. TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 2, at 29-30.
18 The FAA now projects 2010 as a possible implementation date. Hinson,
supra note 3.
19 A common misconception is that the GPS satellites are placed in a geostatio-
nary orbit. A geostationary orbit is one in which the satellite flies at the speed of
the Earth's rotation and thus appears stationary when viewed from the Earth.
Orbital mechanics dictate that for a constant velocity satellite to be geostationary,
the altitude of the satellite should be about 22,000 miles. For GPS satellites, a
lower orbit, at an altitude of about 11,000 miles, is employed and the GPS satel-
lite completes an orbit in about 12 hours. The lower orbit offers better coverage
and maintenance options. See CLARKE, supra note 8, at 4-5.
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and airborne radio receivers to process.the satellite's signals to
determine the receiver's distance from the satellite.2 0 The abil-
ity to receive data from multiple satellites allows the receiver to
unambiguously determine the position of the receiver. 1
The GPS satellites are owned and operated by the U.S. De-
partment of Defense.2 2 A rival Soviet system-GLONASS-was
developed. Although interest in GLONASS had faded some-
what due to doubts about Russia's current economic viability
and intent, there is currently renewed interest in the GLONASS
system.2 3  Proposals for the integrated use of GPS and
GLONASS would result in increased accuracy.24 Both GPS and
GLONASS were developed for military reasons during the Cold
War as a follow-up to earlier satellite navigation systems. Both
the United States and the Soviets developed earlier series of
navigational satellites (some of which still function) for the pur-
pose of allowing their sea-based ballistic missile launching sub-
marines to accurately update and adjust their onboard inertial
navigation systems. These earlier satellites were few in number,
and moved in orbits so that they overflew various portions of the
earth daily. The U.S. system was known as the TRANSIT series.
The accuracy of navigation was adequate, but using the system
was fairly complex, as the receiver had to know some fairly com-
plicated orbital information about the satellite and had to "lis-
ten" to the satellite a significant period of time. The accuracy of
position measurement also depended on the viewing angle of
the satellite above the receiver during the overflight. More im-
portantly, navigation could only be performed when the satel-
lites were "visible." Thus, the navigational use was limited to the
available overflight time of the satellites.2 5 The system was not
suitable for vehicles, such as aircraft, that require rapidly updat-
ing navigational positioning, nor was it suitable for field use by
the Army due to the time-of-use restrictions and the size of the
receiver system needed. The TRANSIT satellite's broadcasts al-
lowed for commercial use, but the accuracy of such use was in-
20 AOPA AIR SAFETY FOUNDATION, GPS TECHNOLOGY No. 1. SAFETY ADVISORY 3
(1996) [hereinafter GPS TECHNOLOGY].
21 Id.
22 CLARKE, supra note 8, at 2-4.
23 Bruce D. Nordwall, Optimism Grows for GPS/GLONASS, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Oct. 14, 1996, at 58.
24 Id.
25 This information comes from the authors' personal observations with the
AN/SRN-9 satellite tracking system employed by the U.S. Navy in the early to
mid-1970s.
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tentionally degraded by encrypting a portion of the satellite's
transmission. Limited commercial use was made of TRANSIT
satellites, primarily by commercial shipping operators.2
The concept of the current GPS system predated TRANSIT's
employment. The decision to implement TRANSIT repre-
sented not only the military's operational needs, but state-of-the-
art analysis of the satellite and computer technology at the time,
as well as the economics involved. Development of the current
GPS satellite system had to await funding and further technolog-
ical development. A fully operational GPS system was not in
place until the 1990s, more than twenty years after satellite navi-
gation systems first were used.27
2. The Current GPS System
The current GPS system has twenty-four satellites (Navigation
System by Timing and Ranging, (NAVSTAR) satellites) in or-
bit.28 The satellites have a limited life due to onboard failures
and deterioration in the space environment.29 As a result, the
useful life of a satellite is estimated at between seven and ten
years . 0 Three of the current twenty-four satellites are spares
that can be repositioned to replace a failed satellite." All of the
currently orbiting satellites were built and designed by Rockwell.
Replacement satellites will be provided by Lockheed Martin.32
Satellites require regular updating from the ground of the mate-
rial that they provide on a broadcast. Older satellites had to be
updated at least every fourteen days, while new satellites only
need to be updated every six months.3 3
3. Operation of the Basic GPS System
Each NAVSTAR satellite contains atomic clocks, transmitters,
solar panels, batteries, and equipment for its own maneuvering
and communications with ground control stations.3 4 Each satel-
26 CLARKE, supra note 8, at 2.






33 This is known respectively as "14-day autonomy" and "180-day autonomy,"
meaning that the satellite can operate on its own for 14 days or 180 days. GPS
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 20, at 2.
34 CLARKE, supra note 8, at 13-22.
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lite transmits data that indicates its orbital parameter in space. 5
The GPS receiver on the ground or in an aircraft determines
the distance from the satellite based on a signal transmitted
from the satellite and it determines the receiver's position in
space by knowing where the satellite was located when it trans-
mitted the signal. 6 The range information from one satellite
describes a position that could be anywhere on the surface of a
sphere centered on the satellite with a radius equal to the dis-
tance from the receiver to the satellite. 7 The intersection of the
distance data obtained from three satellites is sufficient to deter-
mine a position on the Earth's surface, and four satellites' data is
required to unambiguously determine both altitude and posi-
tion, the data needed for aircraft navigation.3 8
Currently, many aircraft use Distance Measuring Equipment
(DME). DME provides a measurement of the distance from the
aircraft to a fixed DME station, usually located at a navigation-
ally interesting point (for example, at a destination airport)."
In operation, the aircraft's equipment transmits a pulse to the
ground-based DME station, and measures the time lapse be-
tween the transmission and the return from the ground station
in order to determine the distance to the DME station.40
In contrast to DME equipment, the GPS receiver is totally pas-
sive. The satellites broadcast ranging signal information contin-
uously. In addition to the distance measuring pulses, the
satellites transmit data that allow the GPS receiver to determine
the satellites' position in space.4
The data transmitted by the satellite is of two types. "Alma-
nac" data generally describes the positions of all the satellites
while "ephemeris" data gives the exact parameters of a particu-
lar satellite's orbit.4 2 The GPS receiver downloads the almanac
and ephemeris data and stores it in the receiver's memory for
processing along with the ranging signal information. 3 The
GPS receiver synchronizes its internal clock to that of the vari-
ous satellites. The receiver then knows the time that the rang-
35 Id. at 16.
36 Id. at 21.
37 Id. at 19.
38 Id. at 19-20.
39 AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 10, ch. 1.
40 Id.
41 CLARKE, supra note 8, at 16-22.
42 DALE DE REMER & DONALD MCLEAN, GLOBAL NAVIGATION FOR PILOTS-IN-
TERNATIONAL FLIGHT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES 203-13 (1993).
43 Id.
696
1997] FREE FLIGHT TECHNOLOGY AND LIABILITY
ing signals left the satellites and the time they arrived at the
receiver, and thus determines the ranges to the satellites.' Be-
cause it also knows where the satellites were when they transmit-
ted the signals, the receiver's position can be determined.45
(See Figure 1.)
FIGURE 1
A. Data processor obtains pseudorange measurements (PR, PR2 ,
PR3, PR4) from four satellites
Time-coded Time each signal
signals transmitted received by








PR -AT4 x c
(c = speed of light)
B. Data processor applies deterministic corrections
PRI = Pseudorange (1 = 1, 2, 3, 4)
* Pseudorange includes actual distance between sat-
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pheric distortions, relativity effects, receiver noise,
and receiver clock bias
* Satellite clock bias, atmospheric distortions, rela-
tivity effects are compensated for by incorpora-
tion of deterministic adjustments to pseudoranges
prior to inclusion into position/time solution
process
C. Data processor performs the position/time solution
Four ranging equations:
(X1 -Qu-) +Qx2 -(@y +(Z, -& Y =(PR, -@ xc
(X 3 y+(Y 3-y+(7,-& =(PR, -@x)
(X 4  ©)+(Y 4 )2y+(Z 4  -D =(PR,,- @ x cy
X1 , Y1, Z, = Satellite position (1 = 1, 2, 3, 4)
* Satellite position broadcast in 50 Hz navigation
message
Data processor solves for:
" Ux, Uy, Uz = User position
* CB = GPS receiver clock bias
4. Accuracy and Integrity Issues
The accuracy of the GPS receiver's determination of the dis-
tance information is determined initially by the clock rate of the
satellite, since the clock rate provides the minimum time inter-
val for measurement.4" Currently, the resolving capability of the
satellite clock is a nanosecond (10-9 second).4 7 Since the speed
of light in vacuo (the speed of a radio signal in space) is approx-
imately 3 x 1010 centimeters per second, if resolution was due
only to the ability to measure the clock to its nearest cycle, the
GPS system should be able to resolve distance to an uncertainty
of thirty centimeters (slightly less than one foot). Unfortu-
nately, real life inaccuracies are larger. In addition to clocking
errors, errors in the knowledge of the statellite's orbit, problems
caused by transmission through the ionosphere, multipath
propagation errors (where refracted signals follow different
paths and arrive at the receiver at slightly different times), and
- GPS TECHNOLOGY, supra note 20, at 3-4.
47 Id. at 4.
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receiver errors, all combine for an overall error of about ten
meters.48
It is important to understand that the accuracy of the GPS
system is quoted in terms of confidence intervals. Generally, the
ninety-five percent confidence interval is quoted for the system
(the system will accurately report the aircraft's position within
the quoted distance ninety-five percent of the time) .49 The con-
fidence intervals are close to one another. As a result, errors
outside the ninety-five percent interval are quite close to the
ninety-five percent interval limits. Thus, it is reasonable to use
the ninety-five percent limits in discussions of GPS system per-
formance and capabilities.5 °
The GPS system was developed with two modes of opera-
tion-Precise Positioning Service (PPS) for military users and
Standard Positioning Service (SPS) for non-military users.5 1
PPS's reported accuracy is twenty-six to thirty meters with ninety-
five percent confidence and sixteen meters with fifty percent
confidence.52 The SPS signal is intentionally degraded (the
term "Selective Availability" is used to describe the degrading
process) to result in a system accuracy of 100 meters with ninety-
five percent confidence. In 1996, the Clinton administration
pledged that the degrading by Selective Availability would be re-
moved over a four to ten year period.53 At the time arguments
were made that without Selective Availability a terrorist move-
ment or state could use the accuracy of GPS to precisely navi-
gate low technology missiles.54 These arguments lost to the post-
Cold War recognition that the utility of the enhanced GPS preci-
sion was of great value. However the military will retain the abil-
ity to reinstate Selective Availability in times of national
emergency.55
Even with SPS's 100 meter accuracy, the basic GPS system is
accurate enough for enroute navigation. 56 Its accuracy of ap-






53 Loring Wirbel, GPS Heads for New Markets, ELECTRONIc ENG'G TIMES, Apr. 15,
1996, at 18.
- See Ramon Lopez, Study Urges Pentagon to Keep GPS Integrity, FLIGHT INT'L,
June 14, 1995.
55 GPS TECHNOLOGY, supra note 20, at 4-5.
56 Id. at 4.
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200-600 feet and to Loran C groundwave accuracy of approxi-
mately 600 feet.57 However, for IFR approaches, the situation is
different. GPS's accuracy is poor in relation to ILS accuracy of
about fifteen to thirty feet near the runway threshold environ-
ment. Therefore, there are add-on fixes to the basic GPS system
to improve accuracy and allow for GPS instrument approaches
that are discussed in more detail below.58
Another issue of great importance to the use of GPS as a pri-
mary means of navigation is the integrity of the system. Integrity
deals with how it can be determined that the GPS system is func-
tioning properly and providing reliable information to the air-
craft's receiver.5 9 For the conventional ILS or VOR system,
integrity is rather straight forward because there is real-time
monitoring of the transmitter's signal quality. If a problem is
detected with the ILS or VOR transmitter, the system is shut
down and the loss of signal triggers a warning flag in the air-
craft's cockpit display.6" In contrast, integrity determinations in
the GPS system are complex. For the GPS system, if only one of
the satellites used to determine a fix is unreliable, the entire fix
is unreliable.61 In contrast to the VOR/ILS, there is no steady
signal from the satellite from which a deviation can be easily
detected. The monitoring of GPS satellites must be done from
the ground.62 If the satellite were to fail totally, there would be
no problem, as the GPS receiver would simply use another satel-
lite.63 But, if the performance level drops due to a small change
in orbit or, for example, a problem with signal timing, the air-
craft's receiver may sense that the satellite is in a location that is
different from its actual location, and induce error into the re-
ceiver's calculation of the aircraft's position.64
Since detection of the non-reliability of a satellite must be
done from the ground, a system must be created that either al-
lows the aircraft's receiver to compute a measure of reliability,
or allows the aircraft's receiver to receive real time information
on reliability from the ground.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 4-5.
60 Id. at 5.
61 CtRKE, supra note 8, at 40-41.
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5. Resolving Accuracy and Integrity Problems
a. Accuracy Corrections
To increase the accuracy of GPS, corrections are made to the
GPS signal based on accuracy checks by ground stations. Gener-
ally, this is known as Differential GPS or DGPS. 65 Local-Area
Differential GPS (LAD) is a variation of the DGPS system, where
a local station monitors the various satellites. 66 Since the posi-
tion of the LAD station is well determined, the station deter-
mines its position from GPS and then determines what
corrections need to be made to the various satellite signals in
order for the GPS position to correctly match the actual posi-
tion. The LAD station then transmits the local corrections on
a low power transmitter for GPS receivers to use to correct the
GPS signals in the vicinity of the LAD station. There are a
number of methods of transmissions, but the most common is
VHF datalink.6
LAD systems are capable of five meter accuracy in the correc-
tion area and provide the basis for the current GPS approaches
to airport used in the IFR situations.69 With LAD, it is projected
that GPS approaches can replace Category I and Category II ILS
approaches. 70 The limit of the LAD system area is typically on
the order of twenty-five miles. LAD is used at civil airports to
provide Special Category I ILS (SCAT-I).71
The problems with LAD systems are the need for the local
stations and the sophistication required for the local stations.
Therefore, LAD is viewed as a short-term resolution of the accu-
racy problem and a new system called Wide Area Augmentation
System (WAAS), described below, is viewed as the long-term so-
lution to both the accuracy and integrity problems.72
b. Integrity Solutions
The current resolution of the GPS integrity problem is to
force the GPS receiver to use more than the minimum required
number of satellites to calculate its position, and then to com-
65 See CLARKE, supra note 8, at 35-37.






72 Id. at 5-6.
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pare that position with the position based on the reception of
the minimum number of satellites. If the positions are not the
same within some acceptable limits of performance, the system
is considered unreliable and an alarm signal analogous to the
ILS/VOR red flag is displayed. 73 Some GPS receivers can deter-
mine which of the satellites is causing problems and "lock out"
that satellite to restore accuracy.7 4
The processing procedure in the GPS receiver is called Re-
ceiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM).7 If the RAIM
software detects an integrity problem, the GPS receiver will not
operate in the approach mode (that is, the GPS receiver cannot
be used to make an IFR approach to an airport) .76 It may, how-
ever, still be used for enroute navigation. If sufficient satellite
reception is available, the RAIM software in some GPS receivers
will allow the receiver to perform sufficient calculations to deter-
mine the "bad" satellite, lock it out, and proceed in approach
mode with reliable satellites, continuing to self-check with
RAIM. 7 7
The drawback to the RAIM system is that more than the mini-
mum number of satellites need to be used. In some areas, par-
ticularly low to the ground where approaches are flown, the GPS
receiver may have difficulty in acquiring and tracking more than
the minimum required number of satellites due to such things
as terrain blocking and antenna alignment. Thus, where the er-
ror checking is most needed, RAIM is most difficult to use. In
addition, RAIM requires the use of calculational time in the re-
ceiver that could be better spent on other problems. There are
other cross-checks with the aircraft's other sensors (for example,
the altimeter) that can be made to detect integrity problems.
c. Wide Area Augmentation System
Contracts have already been awarded for a system to provide a
solution to both the accuracy and integrity problems. 78 The
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) will provide a system
that will allow GPS receivers to be used for CAT I ILS ap-
proaches.79 WAAS is planned for operation beginning in early





78 Id. at 5-6.
79 Id.
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1999.0 The European equivalent to WAAS is European Geosta-
tionary Overlay Service (EGNOS) .81 As currently implemented,
WAAS operates only with GPS, whereas EGNOS will operate
with both GPS and GLONASS.8 2
WAAS will consist of twenty-four ground-based monitoring
stations that will constantly be looking at the satellites' signals as
they fly overhead. 3 They will feed their analysis in real time to
three control stations.8 4 Differential corrections and integrity
information will be computed and uplinked from the control
stations to three geosynchronous broadcast satellites that will
broadcast the information to WAAS-equipped GPS receivers.8 5
This system will provide sufficient accuracy for CAT I ILS, but
for CAT II and CAT III, a LAD system will still need to be
employed.
6
When WAAS is fully implemented, the GPS system will have
the potential to allow instrument approaches to be flown virtu-
ally anywhere a runway exists.8 7 For instance, expensive VOR
and ILS facilities will not be necessary, and a vast expansion of
civil IFR traffic in the United States may result. The FAA will
undoubtedly be faced with requests to implement GPS ap-
proach procedures at a large number of airports that have never
had an instrument approach. This expansion may result in an
interesting set of problems for the ATM system in terms of in-
creasing IFR volume.
B. GETTING THE AIRCRAFT'S POSITION AND INTENTIONS INTO
THE FREE FLIGHT SYSTEM
Assuming that each aircraft in the ATM system can process
GPS information to provide reliable position information, the
next step is to develop the communications system required for
the aircraft to communicate with the ATM system. In concept,
the ATM system needs to know not only where the aircraft is,
but where it intends to go. The current ATM system deals with
some of these problems and can provide some guidance regard-
ing the technologies that need to be employed.
80 Id.
81 Nordwall, supra note 23, at 58.
82 Id.
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In the current ATM system, the controller is aware of the air-
craft's location and is aware of its intentions because the aircraft
is on a flight plan, from which it is not expected to deviate. The
location element is satisfied by the FAA's radar and transponder
systems that provide location and altitude via the Mode C tran-
sponder and/or skin returns on primary radar coupled with ver-
bal reports of position from the aircraft. 8 The communication
of intentions is done by default. The ATM system tells the air-
craft, via the initial flight plan route and subsequent orders
from the controller, where the aircraft should go and the con-
troller visually monitors the radar track of the aircraft to ensure
that the aircraft is complying with the ATM's instructions.8 9
Obviously, some sort of high-speed, two-way data link will
need to be established from each aircraft to the ATM system.
Data links are already in limited use, and the use is expanding in
the airline sector.90 Tower data links have recently been incor-
porated at approximately sixty airports to provide clearance de-
livery, eliminating clearance read backs.9a
Currently, there are two data link systems that are in conten-
tion for implementation. They represent two different con-
cepts. The first is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) system and the second is the Mode S tran-
sponder. The Mode S transponder is currently implemented
with TCAS II hardware and airline pilots already use the TCAS
II system to monitor their separation intervals from other
aircraft.9
2
C. MANAGEMENT OF THE FREE FLIGHT SYSTEM
In order to manage the free flight system, the ATM agency
will need to develop communications receivers for the data link
information and transmission systems to route that data to cen-
tral computers. These computers will monitor the data, display
the data, perform necessary calculations to determine if there
are conflicts, and issue either orders to aircraft or alerts to oper-
ators (controllers) enabling either or both to respond to and
resolve conflict situations. The system will need to have suffi-
cient redundancy and protection against power outages to pro-
88 See generally AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL, supra note 10.
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vide a safe margin of reliability. Obviously, the overall reliability
should be as close to 100% as possible.
The resolution of conflicts involves software calculations of
the projected path of all the aircraft in the system. This software
is often referred to as a "conflict probe."93 The computer
projects vectors for each of the aircraft forward in time to deter-
mine points of conflict.94 In some proof-of-concept systems, the
conflict alerts are displayed to a controller who then uses a com-
puter mouse to drag the aircraft's projected track off its present
course until the conflict is resolved. The controller then issues a
course change based on the computer's suggestion. Obviously
the greater the number of aircraft in the system, and the longer
time in the future the conflict probe projection goes, the more
complex the solution. It can readily be seen that in order to
project accurately, the aircraft's intentions must be a known ele-
ment of the calculation. Furthermore, it is clear that the en-
route, high altitude, point-to-point routing is probably the
easiest to calculate and resolve since the tracks and projections
are relatively stable over long periods of time.95
Although conflict probes exist, the free flight system envi-
sioned is well beyond the limitations of current FAA computers,
except for limited applications.96 Therefore, a new computer
system will need to be developed for free flight.
V. THE POTENTIAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE
FLIGHT OR FREE FLIGHT ELEMENTS
There are already quasi-free flight systems. These include the
National Route Program and the Negotiated Wind Routes and
Ocean Tracking Systems.97 Therefore, to some extent, free
flight is already upon us. These systems involve point-to-point
clearances with the pilot responsible for navigation that is not
along established airways.98 For oceanic routes, the entries are
93 Bill Sweetman, Free-Flight-The Future of U.S. Air Traffic Control, INTERAVIA
Bus. & TECH., Oct. 1995, at 40.
94 Id.
95 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5.
96 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, NTSB/SIR-96/01, SPECIAL INVES-
TIGATION REPORT, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL EQUIPMENT OUTAGES (Jan. 1996).
97 Edward H. Phillips, Mini-'Free Flight'System to Debut at Atlanta Games, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 1, 1996, at 34; FAA Launches Free Flight Initiative, Bus. &
COM. AVIATION, Apr. 1996, at 16.
98 Phillips, supra note 97; FAA Launches Free Flight Initiative, supra note 97.
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space and time blocked, and the aircraft makes position reports
via satellite to indicate that it is conforming to its chosen route.99
The National Route Program is similar to the Oceanic system,
with ingress and egress points.100 Altitudes are blocked and to
some extent the system (which is currently only for flight above
Flight Level 310, with plans to lower the limit to Flight Level
290, and for flight distances greater than 200 miles) probably
will form the basis for how the FAA begins to implement free
flight.1"1 The FAA has estimated that the use of the National
Route Program saved the airlines $40 million in 1994.102 Ameri-
can Airlines has a demonstrated savings of $2.2 million for its
Negotiated Wind Routes in conjunction with the National Route
Program. 0 3
It is typically the American viewpoint that drives free flight,
but it must be recognized that other areas, particularly Europe,
may leap ahead in the development of free flight concepts if the
United States is slow to implement its system. European na-
tional authorities generally have greater autonomy than the
FAA. Furthermore, there is relatively little opposition to control
changes in Europe when compared to the United States.10 4 Eu-
ropean research organizations have been forging ahead on ele-
ments of the Future Aircraft Navigation Systems (FANS). 10 5
Although many of the elements of FANS are what would be fore-
seen as equipment for free flight, free flight and FANS are not
synonymous. FANS is an architecture of hardware; free flight is
an operational control concept that will use the FANS
architecture. 06
United Airlines has already implemented FANS-i equipment
in its trans-Pacific route aircraft. 07 FANS-i uses GPS location
broadcast via satellite to the ATM facility via satellite to provide
automatic position reporting.10 8
99 Phillips, supra note 97; FAA Launches Free Flight Initiative, supra note 97.
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A. WHAT FREE FLIGHT ELEMENTS WILL MOST LIKELY BE
IMPLEMENTED, AND ON WHAT TIMESCALE
It appears extremely likely that an automated data link will be
developed and implemented on a wide scale in the next few
years. Although there is some conjecture as to whether ADS-B
and/or Mode S will be implemented, data links are already be-
ing utilized. 10 9 GPS is already here, and the implementation of
the WAAS system is well underway.110 Thus, within several years,
and certainly by the year 2000, the use of GPS and data link by
airlines should be in place and the basic elements needed for
free flight will be ready.
The FAA has aggressively stepped forward with a plan to eval-
uate the free flight concept with testing in Alaska and Hawaii."'
Starting in 1999 the FAA plans to implement its test.1 2 But the
full implementation of a free flight system for all aircraft, at all
altitudes, and the elimination of the current navigational system
of primary radars, transponders, VOR/DME, and ILS system is,
in the authors' opinion, perhaps thirty to fifty years away, and
may never cover all airspace and aircraft.
Clearly, however, GPS will and probably should rapidly re-
place Loran C and Omega in the next five years. When WAAS is
fully implemented, there would not be much incentive to retain
them, even for safety reasons. Similarly, VOR/DME and ILS will
probably soon follow. Once GPS is fully implemented it can of-
fer far superior accuracy for enroute navigation and at least the
same accuracy (with LADS) for approaches. However, the elimi-
nation of primary radar, or beacon radar, and controllers with
voice contact may be far off. Although these systems are cur-
rently very expensive and free flight advocates envision their
elimination, there may be a strong feeling that the ATM system
should never be "blind" and should be able to deal with aircraft
that, for some reason, can no longer downlink their position (or
for that matter have a failure to receive their information). The
recent 757 accident near Peru, where a "glass cockpit" may have
failed rendering the pilot "blind," may have a lasting impact on
109 See id.; Michael A. Dornheim, Equipment Will Not Prevent Free Flight, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., July 31, 1995, at 44.
110 See James R. Asker, GPS Progress, AVIATION WK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 2, 1996,
at 49. Hughes Complete WAAS Tests Ahead of Schedule, AEROSPACE DAILY, Aug. 29,
1996, at 318.
111 Bruce D. Nordwall, FAA to Use Alaska and Hawaii to Debug Free Flight, AviA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 16, 1996, at 34.
112 Id.
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public acceptance of a totally computer-based system. Perhaps
the ground radar and beacon systems of the future will be differ-
ent from those now in use, but we may never see a free flight
system with radar or voice-radio.
We may also never see a free flight system that encompasses
all of the airspace. Instead, we will probably see is a lowering of
the National Route Plan levels on a progressive basis. These
might drop to some level, say 10,000 feet ASL, that in combina-
tion with an AGL criteria may form the "floor" of the free flight
domain. Since the primary beneficiaries of the free flight sys-
tem are high performance, longer-distance aircraft, a separation
of free flight capable aircraft from other users, like that which is
now performed by Class B airspace, will probably be part of a
free flight system.
B. WHO WILL BUILD THE SYSTEM?
There are a number of manufacturers of FANS equipment.
The authors' impressions are that these are generally the same
avionics manufacturers who have built aircraft avionics for years.
At the lower end of the price spectrum, however, new digital
equipment manufacturers are developing a market share in the
avionics area. The questions of who will build the new ATM
computer systems and develop the software will be played out
over the implementation time of the system. In the wake of the
Cold War wind down it is possible that some of the major de-
fense contractors will be free flight system developers.
How the government will contract for such a system or its
components is open to debate. If it is the current piecemeal
low-bid contracting that hallmarked the failure of the FAA to
revamp its computers, then there may be problems. Both the
FAA and Congress, smarting from the computer fiasco, might
exempt free flight development from normal contracting proce-
dures. This could be done either through special legislation or
enhanced oversight which will ensure a development contract
where the chosen contractor has sufficient expertise and is
granted sufficient control to properly develop and implement
the free flight system.
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VI. LIABILITY ISSUES FOR EQUIPMENT AND
SOFTWARE MANUFACTURERS
A. GENERAL LIABILITY ISSUES FOR MANUFACTURERS
OF HARDWARE
This portion of the Article will discuss liability issues facing
the manufacturers of components for the free flight system, in-
cluding those who provide hardware and software for the air-
borne or ground equipment. This will not be an indepth
discussion, but rather an overview of the various theories of lia-
bility. This section of the Article will also address the govern-
ment contractor and the contract specification defenses.
This Article will not discuss liability issues facing the United
States government. There is an excellent article in an earlier
volume of this journal which provides an analysis of the liability
issues facing the United States regarding the expanded civil use
of the GPS under the Federal Torts Claim Act, the Suits in Ad-
miralty Act, the Foreign Claims Act, the Military Claims Act, the
1967 Outer Space Treaty, and the 1972 Convention on Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (liability
convention).11
The manufacturers of GPS satellites and/or related airborne
or ground equipment may be liable in tort under various theo-
ries of liability just as the manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft
components are. In preparing this Article, a study of case law
dealing with earlier forms of navigational aids and air traffic
control equipment was conducted. The authors' search of the
Lexis federal and state databases revealed no cases involving
older navigation systems (including ADF, NDB, VOR, TACAN,
OMEGA, TRANSIT, or LORAN-C) or air traffic control radar
where the manufacturer was held liable under a negligence or
strict products liability theory. There are very few reported cases
involving the manufacturer's liability for navigational aids,
whatever their use.
The only federal case found involving the accuracy or integ-
rity of the GPS was Connaghan v. Maxus Exploration Co.1"4 The
court in Connaghan dismissed the accuracy of a survey per-
formed using GPS, concluding that GPS "is only used to aid in
S13 See Jonathan M. Epstein, Global Positioning System (GPS): Defining the Legal
Issues of Its Expanding Civil Use, 61 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243 (1995).
114 No. 86-CV-0128-B, 1992 WL 535618 (D. Wyo. Feb. 4, 1992), affd, 5 F.3d
1363 (10th Cir. 1993).
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mapping." 15 The lack of cases is probably due to the sovereign
immunity of the United States government and to the govern-
ment contractor defense. But, if the free flight system becomes
operational, undoubtedly litigation will follow.
The three main categories of potential liability for manufac-
turers of products for the free flight system are liability for negli-
gence, breach of warranty, and strict products liability. A brief
discussion of each follows.
1. Liability Based on Negligence
Under the present law there is no doubt that a manufacturer
may be held liable in a personal injury, wrongful death, or prop-
erty damage case based on a theory of negligence, provided that
the negligence was the legal cause of the injury, death, or dam-
age suffered.116 The negligence may be based on faulty manu-
facture, faulty design, failure to warn, or failure to instruct.1 7
A manufacturer may be held liable for the faulty manufacture
of a product. This theory was raised in the case of In re Korean
Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983.118 The plaintiffs in the KAL
007 case contended that the aircraft was off course due to a
problem in the inertial navigation system (INS). In that case, no
liability was assessed against the designers or manufacturers of
the INS because the issue was never reached. The court stated
that even if faulty manufacture or design could be shown, the
defendants would not be liable because of an unforeseeable, in-
tervening cause (the airliner being shot down by a Russian
fighter).1 19
A manufacturer may be liable for negligence in the design of
a product as well. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section
398 provides:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which
makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is
subject to liability to others whom he should expect to use the
chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm
115 Id. at *6.
116 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir.
1969).
117 Id.; Moorehead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 828 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.
1987); LaBelle v. McCauley Indus. Corp., 649 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1981).
118 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
119 Id.
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caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption
of a safe plan or design.12 °
A manufacturer may also be liable for failure to warn or for
not giving users adequate warnings of known dangerous charac-
teristics.12 1 A breach of the duty to warn may also lead to puni-
tive damages against a manufacturer. 22 In the case of Walter v.
Cessna Aircraft, the manufacturer had known of the increased
likelihood of fuel contamination for a number of years. This
had resulted in several crashes because of the failure of the man-
ufacturer's fuel tank sump drain to adequately remove water
and sediment from the bottom of the fuel tank. The manufac-
turer had drains available for installation which would correct
the problem. Despite the manufacturer's knowledge, it was sev-
eral years before owners of the affected aircraft were fully in-
formed of the product defect. The Walter court held that the
evidence in the case was sufficient to warrant an instruction on
punitive damages based on the manufacturer's reckless disre-
gard for safety.123 The appellate court reversed the trial court,
which had refused to instruct the jury on punitive damages, and
remanded the matter for trial on the punitive damages issue. 124
A manufacturer may be held negligent for failing to provide
information concerning its product. Satellites and the related
equipment needed for the free flight system are highly complex
devices. Detailed information is required to ensure that they
function properly. It is the duty of the manufacturer to supply a
purchaser or user with detailed information and instructions on
the use of the equipment. Failure to provide proper and suffi-
cient information for such sophisticated devices could cause se-
rious accidents and subject the manufacturer to potential
liability.
A manufacturer is normally held to a duty of ordinary care-
the care that can be expected of a reasonable manufacturer
under the same circumstances. However, in a famous early case,
a Michigan court pointed out in its charge to a jury that ordi-
nary care, as applied to an aircraft manufacturer, may be some-
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1974); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335
F. Supp. 1104, 1120 n.48 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D.
169, 173 (M.D. Pa. 1955); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
121 Walter, 358 N.W.2d at 822.
122 Id. at 824.
123 Id. at 822-23.
124 Id. at 824.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
thing more than ordinary care as applied to most other
manufacturers:
The ordinary care that must be exercised is the ordinary care
that must be exercised in view of the results which are likely to
flow from the failure to exercise ordinary care, and ordinary care
in cases where the results of a slip will be slight and unimportant
is not sufficient here to fill the requirements of ordinary care for
the result of failure to exercise it will be dangerous or destructive
to human life. So that the ordinary care which is required to be
exercised by the ordinary skillful individual that I have named is
the care which is commensurate with the damage which will re-
sult if that care is not exercised. And as bearing upon the degree
of care which ordinary care implies, the members of the jury are
perfectly entitled to consider the possible results or the probable
results upon human life of the failure to exercise that ordinary
care. 125
The same is true of the manufacturer of satellites and related
equipment for the free flight environment. When considering
the possible or probable results for the failure to exercise ordi-
nary care, the loss of hundreds of lives, the standard of ordinary
care will be higher than in cases where failure to exercise ordi-
nary care will result in significantly less harm. 126
A manufacturer might not prevail with a defense that in de-
signing and manufacturing its product it met the standard then
generally applicable in the industry.127 The standard that a
manufacturer must meet is the standard of reasonable care and
not necessarily the standard of the industry or of other manufac-
turers in the industry. 12 In another early case standing for this
proposition, T.J. Hooper, the court held that tugboats were un-
seaworthy because they did not have radio receivers despite the
fact that this was not the custom.12 9 Judge Learned Hand
pointed out that the general practice is not necessarily a reason-
able practice and more may be required than is generally
done.13 When dealing with hundreds of lives which could be
lost in a mid-air collision between jumbo jets, relying on a stan-
dard in the industry defense is probably not a wise tactic.
125 Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., 1 Av. Cas. (CCH) 698 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1937).
126 Id.
127 T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 662 (1932).
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2. Liability Based on Breach of Warranty
In addition to possible liability for negligence, a manufacturer
may be liable for breach of warranty. 131 The breach may be of
an express warranty or it may be of a warranty implied by law.13 2
Express warranties are warranties made by the seller to poten-
tial consumers concerning the quality of the product. The Uni-
form Commercial Code provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part
of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an expressed warranty that the
whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty
that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee"
or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an
affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement pur-
porting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of
the goods does not create a warranty.1
33
Thus, an express warranty may be found where the manufac-
turer, in an advertisement or brochure designed to induce
someone to buy a particular product, makes an affirmation of
fact or promise. It is possible that a manufacturer's response to
a Request For Proposal might contain language which could be
construed as an express warranty.
This is another area where there are few reported cases relat-
ing to aviation products suppliers. But breach of warranty ac-
tions have some advantages over negligence actions because of
the burden of proof. Actions based upon breach of warranty
allow a plaintiff to avoid the difficult or sometimes impossible
task of proving negligence or an unreasonably dangerous
defect.
13, Pegasus Helicopters, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 35 F.3d 507, 510
(10th Cir. 1994).
132 Id.; Braniff Airways, 411 F.2d at 427.
133 U.C.C. § 2-313 (1984).
713
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
Some courts still hold that privity of contract is a requirement
for an action based upon breach of warranty.13 4 The basis for
the traditional viewpoint that privity is required is the rationale
that the one who makes representations to generate a sale
should not be responsible for losses sustained by a stranger to
whom the affirmations were not made. 13 5 This rationale does
not apply to a manufacturer who, through advertising, brings
the matter to the attention of the general public and in particu-
lar, to the person who is harmed by the failure of the product to
live up to the representations.1 3 6 Therefore, even in states re-
quiring contractual privity for an action based on a breach of
warranty, compelling reasons exist for not requiring privity in an
action based on the breach of an express warranty through a
general advertisement. Whether a manufacturer/seller has cre-
ated an express warranty through a general advertisement or
some other avenue is a question to be determined by the trier of
fact.
In addition to liability based on the breach of an express war-
ranty, there is also the possibility of an action based on the
breach of an implied warranty. The two basic implied warran-
ties include the general warranty of merchantability and the war-
ranty of fitness for a specific purpose. The general warranty of
merchantability simply means that the product is reasonably fit
for the general purpose for which it was manufactured and
sold.13 7
To establish a breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, a plaintiff must show reliance on the warranty and that
the seller was aware of the particular purpose and use to which
the buyer would put the product. 138 These factors are not re-
quired of a warranty of merchantability, which is the usual war-
ranty involved in products liability cases. 3 9
One of the major issues with implied warranties is whether a
disclaimer of warranty or limitation of remedies is effective
against third party plaintiffs.1 40 Many authorities take the view
134 See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1984); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Heli-
copter Textron, Inc., 24 F.3d 125, 130 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Texas Processed
Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enter., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Texas Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, no writ)). See also M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 5 (1988).
135 FlemingJames, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REv. 44, 48 (1955).
136 Id.
137 Wenningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 75 (1960).
138 Cochran v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 564 F. Supp. 237, 242 (N.D. Miss. 1983).
139 Id.
140 See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 3 (1987).
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that such a disclaimer of warranty, even if binding on the buyer,
cannot be effective against a third person who is not aware of it.
Professor James has observed:
Language must be clear and unambiguous to effect exclusion
of warranties, and will be construed strictly against such effect.
If, for example, there is an express warranty, and also a dis-
claimer of warranties, the former controls ....
Even where the language is clear, a disclaimer will be ineffec-
tive unless it was likely to come to the buyer's attention before
completion of the sale.... Where there is nothing of that sort-
as in the normal retail sales transaction, for instance-there is
rarely any question of disclaimers of warranty....
Disclaimers of warranty or of liability for negligence bind only
the parties to the transaction and do not bind third parties.
Under the usual rule of privity only parties to the transaction may
take advantage of a warranty; hence the effect of a disclaimer is
as broad as the warranty obligation itself. However, where war-
ranties are given more extensive effect and in all cases of negli-
gence, the present principle may be important.... Even a court
which recognizes a third party warranty.., might not follow the
same rule in regard to a third party nonwarranty.
Where the effect of a warranty is extended by reason of the
maker's advertising addressed to the general public, a disclaimer
of warranty clearly expressed in the same advertising should per-
haps be given an equally broad effect. But where the disclaimer
is in the documents of sale between the maker and his vendee, it
should not bind remote vendees. 141
The fact that sovereign immunity and judicially created af-
firmative defenses exist to protect suppliers and the United
States government will preclude some of these theories of liabil-
ity. But should the free flight system be "privatized" in some
form, they could become viable causes of action in a personal
injury or wrongful death case.
3. Strict Products Liability
Breach of warranty is a form of strict liability because proof of
negligence is not required for recovery.1 42 But rules regulating
contracts and sales have complicated the law of warranty, mak-
ing it an ineffective remedy in many cases. 43 As a result, the
doctrine of strict liability in tort evolved. The doctrine of strict
141 James, supra note 135, at 210-11 n.115.
142 See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 140.
143 Id.
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liability has been adopted by all American jurisdictions except
Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Vir-
ginia.'" The doctrine has also been embodied in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 402A, which provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although:
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa-
ration and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.145
Ten years after California adopted strict liability in the semi-
nal case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.146 , a New York
court held that "a manufacturer of a defective product may be
held liable to an innocent bystander, without proof of negli-
gence, for damages sustained in consequence of the defect." 47
In extending the protection to innocent bystanders, the Codling
v. Paglia court wrote:
In today's world it is often only the manufacturer who can
fairly be said to know and to understand when an article is suita-
bly designed and safely made for its intended purpose. Once
floated on the market, many articles in a very real practical sense
defy detection of defect, except possibly in the hands of an ex-
pert after laborious and perhaps even destructive disassembly....
We are accordingly persuaded that from the standpoint ofjustice
as regards the operating aspect of today's products, responsibility
should be laid on the manufacturer.... We take as a highly desir-
able objective the widest feasible availability of useful, nondefec-
tive products.... Obviously, if manufacturers are to be held for
financial losses of nonusers, the economic burden will ultimately
be passed on in part, if not in whole, to the purchasing users.
But considerations of competitive disadvantage will delay or di-
-" See LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW ch. 5, § 5.04 n.6 (1996).
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1974).
146 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963).
147 See Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 624 (N.Y. 1973).
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lute automatic transferral of such added costs. Whatever the to-
tal cost, it will then be borne by those in the system, the
producer, the distributor and the consumer. Pressures will con-
verge on the manufacturer, however, who alone has the practical
opportunity, as well as a considerable incentive, to turn out use-
ful, attractive, but safe products. To impose this economic bur-
den on the manufacturer should encourage safety in design and
148production ....
When bringing an action for strict products liability, the plain-
tiff must prove that the product was defective, that the defect
caused the injury complained of, and that the defect can be
traced to a defendant. 149 But as the doctrine is applied in some
states, it is not essential that the plaintiff identify the specific
defect.1 50 Also, several courts have held that a defect may be
proved by circumstantial evidence.1 5'
The defective condition of a product is not limited to defects
in design or manufacture. The seller must provide, along with
the product, every element necessary to make it safe for use. 152
One such element may be warnings or instructions concerning
the use of the product. The seller must give such warnings and
instructions as are required to inform the user of the product of
the possible risks and inherent limitations of the product. 15 Ab-
sent such warnings, if the product is defective and the defect is a
legal cause of plaintiffs injury, the seller is strictly liable without
proof of negligence.1 5 4
B. LIABILrrY ISSUES FOR SoFrwARE OF DATABASE PROVIDERS
The doctrine of strict liability in tort applies to products
placed in the stream of commerce.1 55 "Courts have not ex-
tended the doctrine of strict liability to transactions whose pri-
148 Id. at 627-28.
149 Swain v. Boening Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 951 (1965).
150 See Bell Aerospace Corp. v. Anderson, 478 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.).
151 See id.; Paul D. Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L.
REv. 325 (1971); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Products Liability: Proof of Defect
Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 51 A.L.R.3d 8 (1973).
152 Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Co., 337 A.2d 893, 902 (Pa. 1975) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A)).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hosp., Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989).
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mary objective is obtaining services."156 Courts have also
declined to apply strict liability where the transaction's service
aspect predominates and any product sale is merely incidental
to the provision of the service. 157 "A product is a physical article
which results from a manufacturing process and is ultimately de-
livered to a consumer .... [A] service is no more than direct
human action or human performance."158
Generally, the software or the database utilized in a computer
system is considered a service and not goods.1 5 9 Therefore, an
action for strict products liability is not normally available for a
defect in the software or database. However, the courts, rather
than relying on a strict dictionary definition, have adopted an
expansive interpretation of the term "product" which will serve
the policy reasons underlying the strict products liability
concept. 160
In one area particularly related to aviation, aeronautical
charts, the courts expanded the definition, thereby subjecting
the provider to strict products liability. In the case of Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 161 the Ninth Circuit provided
this analysis:
Jeppesen approach charts depict graphically the instrument
approach procedure for the particular airport as that procedure
has been promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) after testing and administrative approval. The procedure
includes all pertinent aspects of the approach such as directional
heading, distances, minimum altitudes, turns, radio frequencies
and procedures to be followed if an approach is missed. The
specifications prescribed are set forth by the FAA in tabular
form. Jeppesen acquires this FAA form and portrays the infor-
mation therein on a graphic approach chart. This is Jeppesen's
"product."162
Other cases dealing with approach charts have reached the
same conclusion. 163 The courts tend to focus on the mass pro-
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 676.
159 See Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988).
160 See Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 348-49 (Haw. 1982).
161 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
162 Id. at 341-42.
163 SeeSaloomeyv.Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Though
a 'product' may not include mere provision of architectural design plans or any
similar form of data supplied under individually-tailored service arrangements,
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duction aspect ofJeppesen's aeronautical charts and on the pol-
icy reasons underlying the strict products liability concept.'64
These underlying policy reasons include protecting otherwise
defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and spreading the
cost of compensation throughout society.165 Claims against the
United States have also been allowed for negligence in publish-
ing misleading aeronautical charts or maps. 66
The software/database for the free flight system is the critical
ingredient for its success. The free flight system envisions a pas-
sive role for the air traffic controller who will monitor the system
for potential conflicts and evaluate the proposed solution pro-
vided by the free flight equipment when an aircraft encroaches
upon another aircraft's protected zone. The air traffic control-
ler will only intervene if it does not appear that the equipment
has provided a suitable solution to the conflict. Thus, the free
flight hardware, driven by the software/database, will be the ac-
tive component of the system.
It is possible that a defect in the software or the database
could allow a mid-air collision to occur even though an air traf-
fic controller had been monitoring the aircraft's flight. De-
pending upon the nature of the defect and the factual scenario,
the plaintiff might not have a viable cause of action against the
passive air traffic controller and could be left without a remedy.
An accident of this nature would probably result in a court hold-
ing that the software/database is a product, not a service, based
on the policy reasons stated in the aeronautical chart cases. 167
To hold otherwise would fail to provide protection to the "other-
wise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects." 68
•.. the mass production and marketing of these charts requiresJeppesen to bear
the costs of accidents that are proximately caused by defects in the charts.");
Brocklesby v. United States, 753 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds,
767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Fluor Corp. v.
Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
164 See Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 676-77; Brocklesy, 753 F.2d at 800; Fluor, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 70.
165 Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 230 (Cal. 1982).
166 SeeJames L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Liability of United States for Negligence
of Person Other Than Air Traffic Controller in Connection with Aviation Control Opera-
tions, 47 A.L.R. 85 FED. (1980).
167 See Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 671.
168 Campbell. 649 P.2d at 230.
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C. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
The free flight system envisioned in this Article will be con-
trolled by the United States government and not by free enter-
prise. Given this concept of the free flight system, it is likely that
the United States government will control the acquisition of
hardware and software to implement the system. Consequently,
a manufacturer of hardware and/or software for the free flight
system may raise the government contractor defense (also
known as the "military contract defense") as an affirmative
defense. ' 69
The United States Supreme Court adopted the government
contractor defense in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.1 70 Under
certain conditions, this defense provides protection from state
tort liability for design defect claims to contractors who produce
products for the federal government.17'
Although some courts only allow this defense for military
equipment, most jurisdictions allow the defense for non-mili-
tary, but federally procured equipment.1 72 An argument could
be made that the United States GPS equipment is, in part, mili-
tary equipment (since the current GPS satellites are military)
and that the defense should at least apply to those products pro-
cured by the federal government for military use.
The government contractor defense prohibits the imposition
of liability for product caused injury or death on those who sup-
ply the products pursuant to contracts with the United States,
provided certain conditions are met. In order to displace state
law there must be: (1) a uniquely federal interest and (2) a sig-
nificant conflict between the federal interest and the operation
of state law.1 73 In order for the defense to apply, it must be
shown that: (1) the United States approved reasonably precise
specifications for the product; (2) the product conformed with
the specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about any dangers in the use of the product that were known to
the supplier, but not known to the United States.' 74
169 See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 514 (1988).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 511.
172 Id. at 505-07; see also Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846
(1985).
173 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500.
174 Id. at 512.
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The implication of uniquely federal interests will require that
state law be preempted and replaced by federal common law in
those areas where uniquely federal interests are committed, by
the Constitution and the laws of the United States, to federal
control. 175 There are two uniquely federal interests to be con-
sidered with respect to government contracts. First, United
States government contracts are controlled exclusively by fed-
eral law and the liability of the government contractor, although
a tort liability, arises out of performance of the contract. 176 Sec-
ond, the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in
their course of duty is also a peculiarly federal concern and is
governed by federal law.177
Application of the government contract defense is condi-
tioned upon the existence of a significant conflict between fed-
eral interests and the operation of state law.1 78 Such a conflict
exists where imposition of liability under state law conflicts with
the government's exercise of its discretionary functions. 179 In
order for state law to be displaced, the duty of care imposed by
the state, that is, the asserted basis for the contractor's liability,
must be contrary to the duty imposed by the government con-
tract to manufacture and deliver equipment conforming to the
government's specifications. 80
A true conflict between federal and state law exists where the
contractor was required, by contract, to utilize an allegedly de-
fective component; the decision to use the product in such case
was made by the government; and, that decision was a discre-
tionary function to be protected through application of the de-
fense. 8 ' The fact of extensive government participation in the
design of the product generally provides evidence of a strong
federal interest.1 82 But even if a defendant contractor demon-
strates some conflict between the federal specifications and its
state law duty, the contractor must also show that the conflict
was significant and that there was a uniquely federal interest in
175 Id. at 504.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 505.
178 Id. at 500.
179 Id. at 501.
180 Id. at 509.
181 Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 721 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (S.D. Ill.
1989).
182 Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698, 701 (1989).
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having the conflict resolved in favor of displacing state court
law. 1 83
The government contractor defense is applicable to claims for
products liability based upon principles of negligence. 84 The
elements of the government contractor defense remain the
same whether the plaintiff's theory of recovery is one of negli-
gence or of strict liability.185 The government contractor de-
fense is also valid against claims based on breach of warranty 86
and it may be raised against design defect allegations." 7 But the
defense is not available in cases involving manufacturing de-
fects. Where the defect is caused by shoddy workmanship and
not a defective design, it implicates no federal interest.'
Whether the government contractor defense would bar prod-
ucts liability claims based on a duty to warn depends upon the
factual circumstances. 8
9
The free flight system will use GPS satellites which are already
in place.' 9° These satellites were procured for the military ini-
tially.' 9' Presumably the satellites were built to specifications
provided by the military and any defect would probably entitle
the manufacturer to raise the government contractor defense.
The related free flight system equipment, although not built
for the military, will still be procured by an agency of the United
States government. Depending upon the procurement process
utilized to acquire this equipment, the government contractor
defense may or may not be available. If procured through the
process currently in use, it is probable that the defense could be
raised. Whether the facts of the case establish the conditions for
application of the government contractor defense is a question
for the trier of fact.' 92
183 In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 715 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (E.D.N.Y.
1988).
184 Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 404 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1233 (1988).
185 Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409, 411 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1233, reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1250 (1988).
186 Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408.
187 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
188 Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030, reh'g denied, 495 U.S. 942 (1990).
189 Nicholson v. United Technologies Corp., 697 F. Supp. 598, 604 (D. Conn.
1988).
190 GPS TECHNOLOGY, supra note 20, at 2.
191 CLAmE, supra note 8, at 27.
192 Pietz v. Orthopedic Equip. Co., 562 So. 2d 152, 154 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 823 (1990).
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D. CONTRACT SPECIFICATION DEFENSE
The contract specification defense provides that a manufac-
turer cannot be held liable for producing a product with specifi-
cations that are beyond its control. 193 The defense has been said
to be based on the presumption that a contractor will lack the
experience to evaluate the specifications given to it and, there-
fore, will not be held to the same high standard of care as a
designer."' The contract specification defense has its basis in
negligence principles and applies to products manufactured to
the order and specification of another whether the other is the
government or a private party.195 The government contract de-
fense is not based on ordinary negligence principles and applies
only when the product in question has been manufactured pur-
suant to a contract with the government.
1 96
The basic tenet of the contract specification defense is that a
contractor is not liable for damages resulting from a defective
design where the specifications are provided by another, unless
those design specifications are so defective and dangerous that a
contractor of reasonable prudence would be put on notice that
the product will be dangerously unsafe and likely to cause in-
jury.197 However, not all jurisdictions have recognized this
defense. 198
This defense could possibly be raised in jurisdictions which do
not recognize the government contractor defense for non-mili-
tary equipment. It could also be raised in cases where the equip-
ment is not being procured by the United States government.
But, the defendants who would be defending based on this af-
firmative defense would undoubtedly be very sophisticated hard-
ware manufacturers and would have a difficult time convincing
a jury that they did not appreciate the danger imposed by the
contract specifications.
VI. CONCLUSION
The free flight system is still in the conceptual stage, but mo-
mentum is growing to have a working system in place as soon as
193 Brocklesby, 753 F.2d at 801.
194 Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 384 (D. Kan. 1983).
195 Id.
M Id. at 353-54.
197 Litdehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 803
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967);Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354;
Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 563 (5th Cir. 1985).
198 Collins v. Newman Machine Co., 380 S.E.2d 314, 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
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possible. As stated earlier, the FAA is hoping for implementa-
tion by 2010. Based on what the authors have learned of the
proposed free flight system, it does not appear to provide signifi-
cant performance and/or safety benefits in the approach and
departure phases near airports, the areas where most accidents
occur. By expanding the potential use of instrument ap-
proaches to a greater number of airports, the potential for acci-
dents may even increase on a per flying hour basis. If IFR
operations increase, the number of accidents will increase even
if the accident ratio stays constant. The system does not address
the removal of positive ATM radar control during these critical
phases. At best it provides enhanced freedom in the cruise por-
tion of flight. But if the free flight system is implemented, no
doubt continued research and efforts will be directed towards
removing as much ATM control as possible, even in the airport
environment.
Since the free flight system is just an idea, now is the time to
address potential liability issues facing the manufacturers of
hardware and software for the system. If some form of immu-
nity or some means of limiting damages is built into the pro-
curement of the free flight system equipment, the cost of
implementing free flight should be greatly reduced. If the man-
ufacturers know their liability position beforehand, they should
be able to reduce the cost of the system's components because
they will not need to pass through the cost of liability insurance
or self-retention defense expenses. The government contractor
defense, described above, may provide immunity, but specific
legislation addressing liability issues associated with the free
flight system would have a more significant impact.
The free flight concept has many benefits if created properly.
In addition to the ultimate goal of improving safety, the free
flight system should reduce operating costs for commercial car-
riers. In an ideal world, these savings would be passed on to the
consumers and we all would benefit. The time to address liabil-
ity issues is now, not after the system is operational and the first
major catastrophe has occurred.
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